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On 18 April 2018 the European Commission proposed to 
the Council of the European Union (EU) to sign and 
conclude the trade and investment agreements between 
the European Union and Singapore, with the bilateral 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to follow suit. 
Since 2017, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) and the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement with Canada have already been provisionally 
applied, and they will fully enter into force after 
ratification by all member states. Unlike the Singaporean 
agreements, CETA includes trade and investment 
protection in one mixed agreement. The conclusion of 
three agreements in parallel with the same partner is a 
new phenomenon closely linked to the politicisation of 
the negotiations on CETA and on the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as well as to the 
Singapore Opinion 2/15 of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU). This testifies to the EU’s resilience in trade policy-
making. Neither the sizeable mobilisation of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) nor the complex 
national ratification processes in some EU member states 
have stopped the conclusion of modern trade and 
investment agreements. This policy brief addresses the 
question as to why the EU’s trade policy proved resilient 
in the face of considerable contestation. It argues that 
the absence of a general pan-European opposition and 
the consensus-based decision-making in the EU fostered 
compromise, which was further facilitated by the CJEU. 
 
The ‘paradox of weakness’ in EU trade policy 
 
With the creation of a customs union, the six founding 
members of the European Economic Community 
delegated trade policy to the European level. Now 
comprising 28 members, the EU is one of the largest 
traders in the world, endowed with basically the same 
capacities and competences in the area of trade as any 
country (see Gstöhl & De Bièvre 2018). However, since the 
Executive Summary 
> Despite vocal contestation and fears of domestic 
institutional deadlock over its trade negotiations, 
the European Union has proven resilient in its trade 
policy, notably by concluding bilateral trade and 
investment agreements with important partners, 
including two across the North Atlantic, Canada 
and Mexico.  
> A professionally orchestrated NGO campaign 
against TTIP and CETA that fed scepticism in several 
EU member states was crowned with mixed 
success. Whereas TTIP negotiations were put on 
hold, CETA finally proceeded. The lack of a broad 
pan-European opposition and the strong 
consensual decision-making processes in the EU 
incentivised policy-makers to accommodate 
objections, tread carefully and craft compromise.  
> This process has been further facilitated by the May 
2017 Singapore ruling of the Court of Justice of the 
EU which created room for trade agreements to be 
split according to exclusive and shared 
competences. As a result, new agreements such as 
those with Singapore or Japan now typically 
embrace three agreements in order to expedite 
ratification: trade, investment protection and 
political cooperation.  
> Separating trade and investment agreements 
makes it more difficult for special interests to hold 
free trade agreements hostage and locates 
parliamentary scrutiny at the European level, while 
investment agreements face additional ratification 
by member state parliaments – and a pending 
Court Opinion. 
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EU is not a country, its role in global trade politics is 
sometimes misperceived or underestimated. For instance, 
the newly elected US President Trump wanted to ‘do a 
trade deal’ with Germany to reduce the ‘massive’ trade 
deficit of the US with Germany. Chancellor Merkel and 
other officials repeatedly explained that German trade is 
in the hands of Brussels, not Berlin. In the end, President 
Trump exclaimed he would then do a deal with the EU.  
 
Dealing with the EU can be quite excruciating. On the one 
hand, consensual EU politics may ultimately lead to 
deadlock if agreement among its member states cannot be 
reached. On the other hand, the EU may come out strong 
because of consensual politics. The permanent scrutiny by 
member state representatives and their domestic 
constituencies can reduce the EU negotiator’s autonomy, 
yet strengthen her bargaining power, giving rise to 
Schelling’s famous ‘paradox of weakness’ (see Meunier 
2005; Dür 2007 for an application to EU trade policy).  
 
Historically, the EU’s trading partners have often sighed at 
the toughness of its bargaining stances, experiencing that 
it is almost impossible to outwit a European chief 
negotiator (Paemen & Bensch 1995). The strong position 
of the EU is reflected in its successful attempt to get the 
Doha Development Round off the ground after the Seattle 
impasse in 1999, notably by offering least developed 
countries tariff-free access to its internal market (Poletti 
2010). In addition, the EU has been able to negotiate and 
conclude free trade agreements (FTAs) with large trading 
partners such as South Korea, Canada, Japan and Mexico.  
 
The contrast between the recent failure of TTIP and the 
successful conclusion of CETA offers an interesting 
opportunity to analyse the EU’s resilience, given the 
similarities in partners, ambition, scope and mobilisation 
patterns for and against these treaties. Of course, it could 
simply be argued that the neo-mercantilist US 
administration under Trump froze the negotiations, while 
the centrist Trudeau government in Canada wanted to 
settle the details. Yet, in the EU it looked very much as if 
at least a minority of member states was going to block 
both the CETA and TTIP negotiations. In the end, CETA was 
concluded, is already under provisional application, and 
looks set to obtain national parliamentary approval.  
 
How did the EU manage to cope with public contestation 
and internal resistance in transatlantic trade? The policy 
brief discusses the role of politicisation of civil society and 
the question of who is in control institutionally, including 
the effects of the CJEU’s Opinion 2/15, before outlining 
relevant policy implications.  
 
NGOs: fuelling fears of ‘Frankenfoods’ and ‘secret courts’ 
 
Both TTIP and CETA were characterised by an abolishment 
of almost all tariffs on goods, the liberalisation of a number 
of services, foreign direct investment (FDI), public 
procurement and intellectual property rights, a large 
regulatory trade agenda, and the intention to include 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The EU has been 
a prominent advocate of regulatory cooperation and 
‘behind-the-border’ issues ever since the 1994 Uruguay 
Round Agreement.  
 
Business support for both TTIP and CETA was strong and 
almost unanimous in the EU, ranging from manufacturing 
and services sectors to a remarkable degree of consensus 
in the agricultural sector. It no longer pitted those sectors 
competing with imports, like agriculture, against those 
eager to acquire foreign market access, such as exporters 
of pharmaceuticals. This new interest constellation has 
often been explained by the already low average tariff 
levels, a common desire to tackle regulatory issues, and 
the increased political power of sectors highly integrated 
in global value chains (Baccini, Pinto & Weymouth 2017).  
 
However, public resistance increased in the course of 
professionally run contestation campaigns by NGOs, 
especially from Germany and Austria (such as Attac, 
Campact, Foodwatch, Global 2000 and Mehr Demokratie). 
By contrast, public opposition in Southern and Eastern EU 
member states was much less pronounced. As shown by 
Dür and De Bièvre (2007), civil society organisations need 
to espouse extreme positions and ‘flash campaigns’ on 
trade to mobilise public opinion, in an effort to impact 
policy and foster their own survival by attracting 
supporters. The NGOs successfully created the image of a 
pan-European civil society uprising against the new trade 
politics of regulatory cooperation and investment rules. 
Their campaign relied on four ‘work horses’, among which 
fuelling fears of unhealthy ‘Frankenfoods’ and ‘secret 
courts’ in order to grasp public attention.  
 
First, NGOs took aim at allegedly lower food safety 
standards across the Atlantic. They pointed to chlorinated 
chicken as typical examples of more limited US health and 
safety standards, while remaining silent about the 
questionable practice of treating chicken meat with 
antibiotics or washing pre-packed salad with chlorine in 
Europe. Certain traditional European cheeses (e.g. 
unpasteurised ones) are prohibited in the US because they 
are considered a health hazard.  
 
Second, and similarly, NGOs warned that TTIP (and 
potentially CETA) would open the door for the unlimited 
and unchecked importation of genetically modified 
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organisms (GMOs), despite the fact that the authorisation 
of the use and sale of GMOs is regulated by EU internal 
legislation. Also hormone-treated beef currently is, and 
will remain, banned by EU legislation. No treaty with the 
US would change these EU rules, and political resistance 
against GMOs in Europe has been extraordinarily stable 
over time.  
 
However, NGOs were able to generate fears that the US 
would use the transatlantic trade agreements to pry open 
the EU market to ‘Frankenfoods’ like hormone-treated 
beef, chlorinated chicken and GMOs. The different societal 
preferences and the allegedly different risk assessment 
approaches were furthermore suspected to lead to a risk 
of regulatory chill, inhibiting governments from regulating 
in the public interest for the sake of promoting 
transatlantic convergence and trade.  
 
Third, NGO campaigners took aim at the form of 
negotiations by accusing the European Commission of not 
being transparent. The Commission had actually 
repeatedly proposed to make the negotiation mandate 
publicly available and even wanted to publish draft 
negotiation texts. A minority of EU member states blocked 
the former until October 2014 (although the mandate text 
had already been made public via Swedish transparency 
legislation), and the American side resisted the latter. Still, 
for public effect, NGOs framed this as a result of the 
Commission’s unwillingness to be open and transparent. 
In addition, there were concerns that making TTIP a so-
called ‘living agreement’ would allow a newly created joint 
regulatory cooperation body to take decisions beyond 
democratic control. Yet, although regulators can identify 
new areas for convergence, they cannot circumvent 
parliamentary oversight.  
 
Fourth, for the first time, NGOs took aim at ISDS, depicting 
its inclusion in trade agreements as ‘secret courts’ and a 
‘Trojan horse’, in which multinationals would undermine 
state sovereignty to an unprecedented degree. When the 
European Commission, after a broad public consultation, 
proposed a reformed, more transparent and more 
independent Investor Court System (ICS), NGO 
campaigners did not see this as a victory but stuck to 
outright rejection. They did so despite the fact that non-
inclusion of the ICS would leave the old ISDS system in the 
members states’ Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in 
place. The anti-ISDS movement gained a lot of support, 
especially when American multinationals were portrayed 
as the new rule-makers in the world economy. This also 
helped the anti-CETA campaign, picturing ISDS in the EU-
Canada agreement as a ‘back door’ for US multinationals 
to sue the EU trough their Canadian affiliates.  
NGO campaigners thus professionally and strategically 
sharpened their stances in order to catch the larger 
public’s attention. Much of the campaign was organised, 
financed and coordinated by well-endowed German 
NGOs, and to a lesser extent in Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Other countries, especially in Southern 
Europe, were rather annoyed about the endangerment of 
potential market access and regulatory convergence and 
battled quietly to keep TTIP and CETA negotiations on 
track. As NGOs had spread uncertainty among trade union 
members and social-democratic voters in several North-
Western European countries, business representatives 
that had to some extent supported the inclusion of a more 
transparent form of investment arbitration, started 
advocating to ditch investment from the transatlantic 
trade agreements in order to save them. 
 
Nonetheless, public opinion moved from indifference or 
diffuse consent to outright opposition, mainly in the 
abovementioned core campaign countries. Many policy-
makers also believed that the backlash against trade 
agreements was part of a broader societal trend towards 
populism, euro-scepticism and anti-globalisation 
sentiment in a world of complex crises. 
 
In the case of TTIP, the EU was for the first time negotiating 
bilaterally (and not multilaterally) with a partner of equal 
market size, which had consequences for its bargaining 
leverage. Yet, why was domestic resistance stronger in 
parts of Europe than in North America when it comes to 
NGO campaigns? Whereas in Europe thousands of 
protestors demonstrated in the streets, the STOP TTIP 
campaign of American NGOs took mainly place online and 
was then picked up in the US presidential campaigns as 
well. Buonanno (2017) argues that the bigger opposition 
to TTIP can be traced to the European Commission’s 
employment of myths about a – more – social and green 
Europe in a process of ‘othering’ the US. Anti-Americanism 
was fuelled, especially in Germany, by the erosion of trust 
resulting from US foreign policy decisions such as the Iraq 
war, spying operations by the National Security Agency, 
mistrust of the market dominance of US internet giants, 
and the 2008 financial crisis that was perceived to have its 
origins in the US (Mayer 2015). This helps explain why the 
negotiation of similar agreements with other big trade 
partners have faced little public attention and criticism in 
the EU. Japan is today – unlike in the 1980s – not perceived 
as a threat in Europe and its negotiations with the EU have 
gone almost completely unnoticed (Suzuki 2017). 
 
Member states: controlling EU trade negotiations 
 
The European Commission’s 2015 ‘Trade for All’ strategy 
had to some extent taken criticism on board (European 
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Commission 2015). First, in order to increase 
transparency, the Commission has been publishing 
virtually all EU positions, starting with breaking the 
opposition by a minority of member states against the 
declassification of the TTIP negotiation mandate. Second, 
it proposed to replace the ISDS mechanism by a new 
permanent Investment Court System that works with 
publicly appointed judges, an appeal instance and clear 
rules. Third, with regard to regulatory cooperation, the 
strategy states that no trade agreement will ever lower 
levels of regulatory protection and that the right to 
regulate will always be protected.  
 
A more pressing need to accommodate contestation came 
from the extraordinarily consensual decision-making 
procedure of the EU, which de facto requires all members 
to be on board. Indeed, despite a negotiation mandate 
agreed unanimously by all member states, parliamentary 
majorities in some countries, like those in Germany and 
France, demanded to categorise CETA as a mixed 
agreement. An agreement becomes mixed when it 
contains elements that fall under the exclusive 
competence of the EU as well as elements for which also 
member states hold competences. Such agreements then 
necessitate ratification by the relevant EU institutions – 
the Council of the EU and the European Parliament – and 
by the parliaments of the member states.  
 
This move was necessary to secure support of, among 
others, the German governmental coalition, whose 
representative in the Council of the EU often holds a 
pivotal vote tipping the balance in favour or against. The 
German Minister of Economic Affairs and then president 
of the SPD, Sigmar Gabriel, saw his own party members at 
loggerheads over CETA and TTIP. By involving their 
parliaments, the German and other governments imposed 
executive discipline on their parliamentary majorities, 
kept TTIP and CETA negotiations on track, and limited the 
room for manoeuvre for the Commission negotiator. 
 
This also strengthened the bargaining power of the 
European Commission, as it had to ask Canada for changes 
to CETA even when that treaty had already been initialled. 
As the Canadian side was keen enough to retain the 
benefits of the agreement, it agreed to the alteration. 
Given the lower eagerness to conclude a TTIP in American 
politics, which already emerged during the presidential 
election campaign, such concessions were not 
forthcoming in the US, even before the TTIP negotiations 
were interrupted. 
 
Little did EU negotiators realise that asking for national 
parliamentary approval would also give regional Belgian 
parliaments a veto power under the country’s 
constitutional laws. The minister-president of the Walloon 
government, Paul Magnette from the Socialist Party, 
seized the political opportunity by threatening to block 
CETA as long as ICS remained part of the agreement and 
as long as a number of further reassurances were not 
included. EU trade policy-makers and observers feared 
stalemate. Yet after a week of suspense, the red light 
turned green (Magnette 2017). As part of the compromise 
reached in October 2016, the EU and Canada issued an 
interpretative declaration stressing the continued right to 
regulate in the public interest, the impartiality and fairness 
of the ICS and their commitment to sustainable 
development and high labour and environmental 
standards. Furthermore, the Belgian federal government 
agreed to request a CJEU Opinion on the compatibility of 
the ICS with EU law. It did so in September 2017 and 
Opinion 1/17 is currently pending. 
 
Commission: splitting trade and investment agreements 
 
When interpreting the application of the Lisbon Treaty 
with respect to the Singapore FTA, the CJEU in May 2017 
clarified in its Opinion 2/15 that the EU holds exclusive 
competence regarding all matters of trade (CJEU 2017). 
This includes trade in goods and services (including all 
transport services), public procurement and energy 
generation from sustainable non-fossil sources, provisions 
concerning intellectual property rights, competition 
policy, FDI, dispute settlement other than non-direct 
foreign investment, and sustainable development. 
However, the Court made clear that in two areas these 
competences are shared with the EU member states: non-
direct foreign investment (i.e. portfolio investment) and 
dispute settlement between investors and states.  
 
On the one hand, the Court’s decision thus confirms that 
agreements like CETA must be considered mixed 
agreements, requiring ratification by all EU member states 
(and thus also the Belgian regional parliaments). On the 
other hand, the Court’s Opinion opened up the possibility 
to split investment protection from EU trade agreements, 
with the latter being approved in an ‘EU-only’ procedure. 
It is important to point out that also the ‘EU-only’ 
procedure is highly consensual as it requires a simple 
majority in the European Parliament and at least a 
qualified majority, and in practice consensus approval, by 
all member state representatives in the Council of the EU. 
This dual approach is also the route which the EU pursues 
for its trade and investment agreements with Japan. While 
the Economic Partnership Agreement has been concluded, 
bilateral negotiations pertaining to portfolio investment 
and investment arbitration are still ongoing and will, if 
concluded, take the form of a mixed agreement – as does 
the Strategic Partnership Agreement with Japan.   
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Policy implications 
 
This policy brief examined why the EU’s trade policy 
turned out to be resilient in the face of considerable 
politicisation and domestic resistance against the 
transatlantic trade agreements. The active NGO campaign 
and the high decision-making threshold among member 
states have not led to a standstill in EU trade policy. In fact, 
the EU is actively negotiating with a number of countries 
in order to conclude new agreements, and the ‘Trump 
effect’ has even accelerated certain negotiations such as 
those with Mexico and Japan. We argued that EU trade 
policy resilience can be explained by the lack of a genuine 
pan-European civil society mobilisation and opposition 
and by member state control over trade policy because of 
its consensual decision-making processes.  
 
While politicisation per se is not necessarily negative as it 
leads to more public debate on important issues and 
potentially even to better solutions, oversimplifications 
and misinformation can become a challenge, especially in 
view of the stricter post-Lisbon ratification requirements 
for EU trade agreements. The clarification of competences 
by the CJEU generated the option of concluding separate 
trade and investment agreements to avoid lengthy and 
complicated ratification procedures for trade deals. This 
approach of splitting FTAs from broader questions 
negotiated in parallel has in fact already been practiced 
with regard to political cooperation agreements.  
 
Several lessons can be drawn from this analysis. First, the 
anti-TTIP and anti-CETA mobilisation, as opposed to the 
lack of politicisation against the agreements with Japan, 
shows that not just the contents of trade agreements but 
also the (perception of) trade partners themselves matter. 
Given the US President’s erratic trade policy since 2017, as 
exemplified by his stance on the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
and threats of ‘trade wars’, TTIP may in the future well be 
revived in a slimmed down version that excludes 
investment protection and arbitration. TTIP under a 
different name could then still trigger an NGO campaign 
2.0, even though at the moment, freer trade appears to be 
more popular in Europe as a result of Donald Trump’s 
opposition to it. The European Commission and the 
member states should then be better prepared to 
communicate their trade policy and its expected impact. 
 
Second, separating investment protection from trade 
agreements outmanoeuvres in a way parts of the 
opposition to treaties like TTIP or CETA. Democratic 
control over FTAs covering only EU competences is carried 
out by the European Parliament and the governmental 
majorities in the member states. It ensures an effective 
trade policy and makes ‘involuntary defection’ in the 
ratification process of FTAs less likely, thus strengthening 
the Commission’s credibility as a negotiator. At the same 
time, investment protection agreements remain subject to 
additional ratification (and ‘input legitimacy’) by national 
and regional parliaments.  
 
Third, the European Commission now has a more solid 
legal argument against member states’ political pressure 
to turn a trade deal into a mixed agreement than it did 
before Opinion 2/15. Moreover, there would no longer be 
a need for the provisional application of an agreement, 
which would create more legal certainty. On the other 
hand, the separate negotiation of stand-alone investment 
agreements risks weakening the Commission’s bargaining 
leverage if not pursued strictly in parallel with the FTA. 
 
Fourth, a negative Opinion 1/17 of the CJEU on whether 
the ICS is compatible with EU law would stall the 
ratification of CETA. Indeed, it may well be that the Court 
will find that the principle of equality under EU law is 
violated because foreign investors would have rights 
which domestic investors do not. Splitting off the 
investment part would then be a logical solution. 
 
Fifth, in case the ratification of investment protection 
agreements fails, or the CJEU would consider the ICS not 
compatible with the EU legal order, the member states 
could revert to traditional BITs – although this was not the 
intention of the Lisbon Treaty which had included FDI in 
the common commercial policy. Compared to the 
Investment Court System, the ISDS mechanisms in those 
bilateral treaties are, however, much worse in terms of 
transparency or protection standards, in particular with 
regard to societal concerns. Under the post-Lisbon 
transitional arrangement, the EU member states may 
under certain conditions still conclude BITs. This could lead 
to a creeping re-nationalisation which would, however, at 
least to some extent contribute to avoiding a gap in the 
protection of EU investments abroad.  
 
Finally, the EU is advocating the creation of a Multilateral 
Investment Court (MIC), which would address some of the 
legitimacy concerns faced by ISDS. On 20 March 2018, the 
Council of the EU adopted and published the mandate 
authorising the Commission to negotiate a convention 
establishing an MIC under the auspices of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). It remains to be seen though how the CJEU 
will view such a judicial ‘competitor’, and Opinion 1/17 will 
be very instructive in this regard.  
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